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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

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119

22 November 1967

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WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

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Information as of 1600
22 November 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

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Fighting continues around Dak To and there are signs the action will spread to other places in the highlands.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
US forces are still fighting on Hill 875, the strategic high point in southwestern Kontum Province, but appear to be in control of the summit. Meanwhile, there are further indications that enemy activity may increase elsewhere in the central highlands (Paras. 1-5). Yesterday's report on the enemy's use of large-caliber artillery and rockets in the Mekong Delta was wrong (Para. 6). Weekly review of South Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 7). (charts)

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
A special committee of the lower house intends to intercede with the government for the release of 17 students drafted for staging antigovernment demonstrations. A similar committee has been established in the Senate to intervene on behalf of persons arrested in connection with the abortive coup of 19 February 1965 (Paras. 1-4). The Phoenix has left Da Nang and may be heading for Saigon or Cambodia (Para. 5).

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IV. Other Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

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
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The fighting in the Dak To area of southwestern Kontum Province goes on. US forces have apparently gained control of the summit of Hill 875, a strategic high point some 16 miles southwest of Dak To. US patrols sweeping the slopes and nearby areas reported sporadic contact with the enemy on 22 November.

2. The enemy's determined defense of key points surrounding Dak To strongly suggests more fighting as allied forces continue to seek out the Communist units--numbering some 8,000 men--scattered throughout the mountains of southwestern Kontum Province.

3. Meanwhile, there are indications that enemy units in other areas of the central highlands have been ordered to make small-scale attacks in order to tie down allied troops and relieve pressure on the North Vietnamese 1st Division south and west of Dak To.

4. In recent days allied patrols have clashed with enemy units near the US Special Forces Camp at Plei Mrong in northern Pleiku Province and on Route 19 between Duc Co and Pleiku city. On 16 November, Duc Co itself was hit by some 50 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire. The North Vietnamese 95B Regiment is believed to have been involved in these attacks, as well as in harassment activity along Highway 14, the main allied supply route to Dak To. There are indications [redacted] that the North Vietnamese K101 Battalion and the 200th Artillery Battalion may also be involved.

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5. To the south, [redacted] the North Vietnamese 33rd Regiment will continue in action in northern Darlac Province. Recently monitored messages in this area disclose extensive resupply operations. [redacted]

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Use of Large-Caliber Weapons in the Delta Not Confirmed

6. On closer examination, the shell fragments from the 17 and 19 November attacks on the Cai Cai Special Forces Camp in the Mekong Delta province of Kien Phong turns out to be rounds from 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 82-mm. mortars. First reports stated that 122-mm. rockets and 105-mm. howitzers might have been used in the shellings. [REDACTED]

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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

7. The week of 12-18 November compared with the week of 5-11 November:

I. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>US</u>	
	<u>5-11 Nov</u>	<u>12-18 Nov</u>	<u>5-11 Nov</u>	<u>12-18 Nov</u>
Killed	1,802	1,287	174	225
Wounded	-----	-----	759	1,251
Missing/ Captured	-----	-----	---	-----
TOTALS	1,802	1,287	933	1,476

	<u>GVN</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>5-11 Nov</u>	<u>12-18 Nov</u>	<u>5-11 Nov</u>	<u>12-18 Nov</u>
Killed	279	269	57	10
Wounded	810	632	103	20
Missing/ Captured	91	74	---	--
TOTALS	1,180	975	160	30

II. Viet Cong Incidents

	<u>5-11 Nov</u>	<u>12-18 Nov</u>
Attacks	59	53
Battalion or Larger	2	2
Small Unit.	57	51
Harassment	245	332
Terrorism	26	27
Sabotage	48	45
Propaganda	2	8
Antiaircraft	<u>137</u>	<u>259</u>
TOTALS	517	724

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III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>5-11 Nov</u>	<u>12-18 Nov</u>	<u>5-11 Nov</u>	<u>12-18 Nov</u>
Individual	367	Not	225	233
Crew-Served	45	Reported	6	4
TOTALS	412		231	237

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
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
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Weapons Losses



Casualties (Killed only)*







US Casualties to Date: Killed 14,956 Wounded 93,130 Captured 218 Missing 580

*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly and monthly figure will represent only personnel killed.

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The lower house "Committee to Intervene for the Release of Student Demonstrators" has elected as officers three men who have been quite outspoken in their criticism of the government. Committee chairman Truc Vien, vice chairman Nguyen Dai Bang, and secretary Nguyen Trong Nho were instrumental in establishing the committee, which intends to petition the government for the release of 17 students arrested and subsequently drafted for demonstrating against the presidential elections.

2. At the house session on 21 November Nho said that the committee had already sent a letter to the government proposing discussion of the student cases. He added that if Prime Minister Loc refuses to meet with the committee, he will be called before "us"--presumably the full house--to explain his actions.

3. The Senate on 18 November also established a committee to intervene with the government on similar matters, but its committee appears less opposition-centered than that of the lower house. The Senate committee will concern itself primarily with the cases of coup plotters arrested after the abortive coup of 19 February 1965.

4. The question first arose when Senator Tran Van Don submitted a petition, initiated by him and signed by 32 other senators, requesting that the case of former General Lam Van Phat be reviewed. Phat, sentenced to death in absentia for his part in the coup attempt of 1965, recently sent President Thieu a letter, through the temporary Senate chairman, "explaining the injustice done him." Following lengthy discussion of this and other requests for Senate intercession, the Senate decided that the cases of all 45 persons implicated should be reviewed and, for this purpose, set up a "Special Committee to Consider Applications for Intervention." The committee is composed of two men from each of the Senate's six slates.

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Quakers Depart Da Nang

5. The Quakers on the yacht Phoenix allowed themselves to be towed to sea from Da Nang without incident on 22 November but may now be headed for Saigon or Cambodia. A crew member told a consular officer before departing that the Quakers were contemplating a trip to Saigon to present their case to the government. The source left a telegram to be sent to a Quaker representative in Phnom Penh saying the Phoenix would proceed to either Vung Tau or Cambodia. The crew member now claims, contrary to earlier government reports, that the Quakers did not insist on delivering their medical supplies directly to the militant Buddhists. The Quakers are willing, and have been all along, to turn them over to the Vietnamese Red Cross, as the government has stipulated. A misunderstanding apparently arose when a delegation of Buddhists arrived in Da Nang demanding delivery of the supplies, leading the government to believe there had been some contact between the Quakers and the Buddhists.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Ambassadors Return to Hanoi

4. The North Vietnamese ambassadors to Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and East Germany have returned to Hanoi in the past ten days [redacted]

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[redacted] The simultaneous return of so many strongly suggests that a conference is being held to deal with some special problem. There are hints [redacted]

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[redacted] that their travel is connected with the implementation of the economic aid agreements concluded recently with their host countries, but this seems unlikely.

5. It also seems unlikely that another general North Vietnamese policy review is under way. The last such review was held this summer and appears to have covered the entire range of issues related to the war. Hanoi's chief diplomats in France, Moscow, and Peking probably would return for another gathering of that kind; so far there is no sign they have. Moreover, the North Vietnamese ambassador to Indonesia just returned to his post after an extended stay in Hanoi following the earlier session.

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